Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Folk psychology, everyday psychology: are expressions for psychological theories describing mental processes and states with everyday concepts and have the claim to provide explanations for these mental processes and conditions with everyday terms. The claim of these theories is based, among other things, on the fact that our experiences are ultimately not exhaustively covered by physical descriptions. See also physicalism, reductionism, reduction, qualia, sensations, explanations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Folk Psychology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs simultaneously. >Functional role, >Belief. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). Then both have the same T#-correlated functional role. (T* = folk psychology). >Meaning theory/Loar, cf. >Homophony. I 276 Here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. >Uniqueness condition. It is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p". N.b. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context. Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. >Opaque context. I 34 All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Schiffer: Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. I 38 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. In w he has a correct use of "Arthrite". Then he has in w not the believe that he has arthrite in his thigh - (because this belief is false). N.b.: in w he is in exactly the same T*-correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false. >Functionalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Folk Psychology
